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Abstract
Estimating the wage penalty for maternal leave1
The focus of this paper is the size of the wage penalty due to maternal leave incurred 
by working mothers in Germany. Existing estimates suggest two-digit penalties of up 
to 30 percent, with very little rebound over time. We apply recent panel data methods 
designed to address problems of sample selectivity, unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity to German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) data. The selectivity issue 
arises because no wage is observed for employees who are on leave. Heterogeneity 
takes the form of unobserved individual effects correlated with explanatory variables. 
Endogeneity is due to the simultaneity of the wage and participation outcomes. 
Heckman’s classic treatment of selectivity requires extensions to deal with both 
heterogeneity and simultaneity. We present an extension for the case of a censored 
tobit participation model and use it to exploit the actual working hours data available 
in GSOEP. We also investigate the sensitivity of the results to the choice of method. 
Our estimates imply a wage penalty due to maternal leave which although substantial 
remains below previous estimates. Furthermore, we find that this penalty is less 
persistent than other studies suggest. Five years after the career interruption mothers 
seem to have caught up.
Key-words: maternal leave, wage penalty, tobit selection, GSOEP. 
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1.  Introduction 
Since Mincer and Polachek’s (1974) seminal paper on the earnings of women, the wage 
penalties for family related career breaks have been investigated with different data and 
methods leading to a variety of estimates. Some obvious explanations for the differences 
between estimates are differences or changes in local conditions, such as institutional, 
legal, economic and cultural circumstances, and the selection of indirect effects and 
controls included. However, part of the differences is to be explained by the way 
problems such as sample selectivity, unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity have 
been dealt with. This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing the wage penalty for 
maternal leave with recent panel data methods that simultaneously account for all three 
problems. Using data for the period 1994-2005 from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP), and building on methodological advancements by Wooldridge (1995) and 
Semykina and Wooldridge (2006), we investigate the size of the wage penalty for 
maternal leave and its sensitivity to the method used.   
The mainstream approach to the sample selectivity problem in wage equations is 
due to Heckman (1976, 1979). Previous studies that follow this approach typically use a 
probit selection equation to model labour market participation and from it derive inverse 
Mills ratios to serve as correction terms in the earnings function. However, the choice 
faced by mothers is not just whether or not to work, but also whether to take on a full-
time or a part-time job, and more specifically how many hours to work. We can use more 
information if we explicitly model women’s decision about the extent of participation and 
use that to correct for selectivity in a wage equation. The extent of participation is 
measured in GSOEP by the actual working hours of respondents (although they only 
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report it for one week). Since the choice of working hours is naturally limited we specify 
it as a censored tobit process. An outcome limited by bounds is obviously more 
informative than a binary outcome and the tobit specification should therefore be more 
efficient in terms of data usage than a probit or logit one. Because the choice of working 
hours is explicitly made within the model, working hours will be treated as an 
endogenous regressor in the wage equation.  
In the context of panel data, the tobit specification shares with the probit 
specification a difficult technical complication. Heterogeneity, in the standard form of 
unobserved individual effects, causes an incidental parameters problem which 
undermines the consistency of Fixed Effects (FE) estimators.1 Semykina and Wooldridge 
(2006) have proposed to circumvent the incidental parameters problem in a probit 
selection model by modelling the unobserved individual effects as linear functions of 
appropriate instrumental variables or time averages, following ideas of Mundlak (1978) 
and Chamberlain (1980).2 In this paper, we follow the Semykina-Wooldridge proposal 
but adapt it to the case of the censored tobit (rather than probit) participation model.  
We use here the term maternal leave to cover both the legally mandatory break 
around maternity (called maternity protection) and additional time off work taken by a 
                                                 
1 This is because every new panel member comes with a new “parameter”, the unobserved individual 
effect, and even if the panel size is increased in the cross-sectional dimension, information does not 
accumulate about individual effects. The usual, FE approach is to eliminate incidental parameters by a 
clever data transformation, but in nonlinear models like the probit and tobit selection models this is not 
generally possible. The standard Random Effects (RE) approach avoids the incidental parameters problem 
altogether at the cost of assuming independence (more precisely uncorrelatedness) between the unobserved 
effects and all observed explanatory variables – a radical assumption that is untenable in our application 
and that must be avoided. 
2 For the case of probit-based selectivity in panel data, Kyriazidou (1997) and Rochina-Barrachina (1999) 
propose alternative corrections based on pairwise differencing of observations; for a thorough discussion 
and comparison of these methods, see Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007). Different approaches 
based on the imputation of potential wages for subjects not in work are explored by Olivetti and Petrongolo 
(2006).   
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mother to look after her child in the framework of German parental leave legislation. We 
use the term maternal leave wage penalty in the limitative sense of the partial or direct 
effect of maternal leave on wages as distinct from a reduction in working hours, foregone 
experience, or lost tenure, which are observable separately. The overall wage 
disadvantage of mothers, combining direct and indirect effects, is variously known in the 
literature as motherhood wage penalty, child penalty or family gap (Waldfogel 1998, 
Budig and England 2001, Simonsen and Skipper 2006).  
Several possible explanations can be found in the literature for wage penalties 
related to motherhood, such as discrimination, job matching, human capital theory and 
signalling. The first two are of little relevance for the specific case of maternal leave.3  By 
far the most widely quoted explanation which directly applies to maternal leave comes 
from human capital theory. Maternal leave may lead to a decrease in wages as a 
consequence of human capital depreciation (Mincer and Polachek 1974; Mincer and Ofek 
1982).4 The standard economic model of wage growth and career interruptions assumes 
that workers are paid according to their productivity which is in turn determined by the 
accumulation of human capital. During career interruptions individuals not only cease to 
accumulate experience but also face human capital deterioration due to non-use or 
atrophy of their human capital stock. The ensuing decrease in productivity could explain 
                                                 
3 The discrimination approach suggests that employers pay lower wages to mothers because they assume 
that mothers put less effort in the job (Waldfogel 1998). Therefore, the focus is on the presence of children 
instead of on career interruptions.  The matching approach explains the wage penalty by the loss of the 
rents of a good match when highly skilled women who get children interrupt their careers (Anderson et al. 
2002). However, jobs of mothers who are on maternal leave are protected by legislation which means they 
can return to the same job they had before the career interruption.  
4 A reverse channel of causality has also been considered in the literature which emphasizes that women 
who earn a low wage could select themselves into child-bearing; see Lundberg and Rose (2000) for the US, 
and Kunze and Ejrnaes (2004) for Germany.   
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a decrease in wages.5 This decrease in wages may not be entirely irreversible in theory. 
Mincer and Ofek (1982) distinguish between short and long run effects. The rate of net 
investment in human capital is likely to accelerate in the period directly following an 
interruption in order to restore the loss incurred. Hence the wage penalty would be higher 
immediately after a career interruption than in later years.  
A second explanation for the maternal leave wage penalty might come from the 
signalling approach. This approach links the wage penalty to the length of the career 
break, considering that longer periods spent in parental leave would signal a woman’s 
character with respect to career commitment for potential employers (Albrecht et al. 
1999).  
Compared to the extensive literature on the motherhood wage penalty, the 
component of the penalty due specifically to maternal leave has been less extensively 
researched.6 In order to analyse its magnitude and persistence, it is necessary to 
distinguish the different possible types of career interruptions: periods out of the labour 
market, periods spent in parental leave, periods of unemployment, military service, other 
activity or diverse. For Sweden, Albrecht et al. (1999) measure the accumulated duration 
in months of the aforementioned career breaks. They find only a relatively small penalty 
due to parental leave (0.15% per month of interruption), or household time (0.13%), 
whereas the penalty due to unemployment is significantly higher (0.37%).  The fact that 
                                                 
5 In addition, Mincer and Ofek (1982) argue that wages could also be affected by less investment in 
training during the pre-interruption periods as workers anticipate the career break. A complementary 
explanation may be that mothers upon return to work change jobs or firms and therefore the wage penalty 
is also partly due to firm specific human capital loss (Kunze 2002). 
6  Estimates of the motherhood wage penalty range between 3 to 7% for one child, 9 to 13% for two or 
more children for the US (Waldfogel 1998, Harkness and Waldfogel 2003, Budig and England 2001, 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel 2005); 2 to 9% for one child, 12 to 25% for two or more children for the 
UK (Harkness and Waldfogel 2003, Davies and Pierre 2005); 2 to 4% for one child, 11 to 12% for two or 
more children for Germany (Harkness and Waldfogel 2003, Davies and Pierre 2005).  
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parental leave and household time result in similar effects on wages is interpreted as 
evidence in favour of women’s human capital depreciation.  
Most studies of German data find a large and significant negative effect of 
maternal leave on women’s wage rates.  Kunze (2002) investigates wage penalties in a 
sample of full-time skilled workers highly attached to the labour market who are 
followed during their early career. She differentiates between parental leave (including 
the “maternity protection” period), and other career breaks, such as unemployment, 
national service and non-working. The effect of career interruptions is measured using 
dummy variables for the occurrence of career interruptions in each of the previous six 
years or more. She finds a wage penalty of more than 18% for a parental leave 
interruption in the previous year and 4.75 % for time out of the labour market, after 
correcting for individual effects. The effect is found to be quite persisitent through time 
for parental leave interruptions (still 13% after five years) whereas the penalty for time 
out of the labour market seems to fade away after four years. Beblo and Wolf (2002) also 
distinguish among various types of career breaks: parental leave (including the 
“maternity protection” period), unemployment, training and military service, and periods 
out of the labour force. These are measured as the fraction of time spent in a certain state 
in each of the previous ten years or more. However, they find no significant penalty for 
parental leave whereas for being out of the labour force they find a sizable wage penalty 
of 5% to 8%. 
 The latest studies for Germany use treatment effects evaluation to control for 
selection into motherhood. Kunze and Ejrnaes (2004) study the evolution of women’s 
wages in Germany around the birth of their first child and use matching to construct a 
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comparison group with similar labour market characteristics. They instrument 
experience, unemployment and parental leave.7 They report that new mothers returning to 
work suffer a drop in wages of about 10 to 20 percent and that women who remain 
childless have different wage and labour market processes than mothers. Beblo, Bender 
and Wolf (2006) use another matching strategy and create a control group of women who 
have been continuously employed by the same firm, and have the same probability of 
becoming a mother. Using conditional difference in difference estimation and matching 
methods, they find a large penalty for child related career interruptions of 25 to 30% of 
the daily wage one year after reentry. This gap diminishes when they control for firm-
specific effects, suggesting that women anticipating motherhood select firms imposing 
low maternal leave penalties.  
In line with the existing literature, we distinguish between different types of 
career interruptions as well as between short term and delayed effects of maternal leave 
on wages. From the GSOEP data files covering 1994 through 2005, we calculate the time 
share of maternal leave in the five calendar years preceding each wave and include these 
in the wage equation for working mothers. The rationale is that the time share of 
interruptions in the immediately preceding year will capture the direct short term effect of 
maternal leave, whereas the share of interruptions in earlier years (t-2 until t-5) will 
capture delayed effects. We also control for the number of children and for other types of 
career interruptions in the last five years. We find robust evidence of a substantial wage 
penalty in the first year following maternal leave which ranges between 6 and 14 percent, 
                                                 
7 The instruments used by Kunze and Ejrnaes (2004) were lagged levels of work experience, work 
experience squared, unemployment, age at entry into the labour market, and first differences in potential 
experience. Parental leave is instrumented with changes in the parental leave system and the availability of 
child care facilities in the region. Unemployment is instrumented with the regional unemployment rate.  
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which is not nearly as high as some previous estimates. In subsequent years the maternal 
leave penalty is apparently made up for, although there is a resurgence in the fourth year 
possibly due to late returners. In the fifth year following maternity there seems to be no 
direct maternal leave effect left. The effect of non-maternal interruptions seems to 
dwindle after three years.  
Our estimation results confirm the existence of selectivity, heterogeneity and 
endogeneity biases. In particular, accounting for the endogeneity of actual working hours 
practically doubles the estimated wage penalties and reverses the relationship between 
the wage rate and the number of hours worked.   
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss the 
maternity and parental leave system in Germany. Section 3 introduces our econometric 
model.  The GSOEP data set used is described in Section 4. Results are presented in 
Section 5 and concluding remarks in Section 6. 
 
2. German Maternal Leave Legislation 
The traditional German parental leave policy is based on the “breadwinner model” which 
assumes that the mother stays at home to provide child care while the father works to 
provide the family income. As times are changing, it becomes increasingly acceptable 
and desirable for women with young children to work as well. The current model may 
therefore be described as the “one and a half earner model” in which the father works 
full-time and the mother has a part-time job (Spiess and Wrohlich, 2006). The preference 
for a part-time job must be seen in the context of a limited supply of day care centres for 
children below three years. Especially in the Western part of Germany it is hard to get 
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day care for young children, which complicates the combination of a full-time job with 
child care.8 
 In Germany, the rights of young mothers as well as fathers are protected by 
maternal leave legislation which is based on the “Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz” (“child-
rearing benefit law”) enacted in 1986 and extended several times since. Under the current 
maternal leave legislation it is compulsory for pregnant women to take leave for a 
“maternity protection” period of six weeks before the estimated birth date and eight 
weeks after child delivery. During this period work is prohibited. The maternal leave 
legalisation further includes maternity benefits which are provided to full-time and part-
time working parents, but also to non-working and unemployed parents if the annual 
income is below a certain limit. The parent, usually the mother, who stays at home is 
entitled to receive the benefit regardless of her employment status in the first six months, 
although the benefits are lower for parents who do not work full-time. After the first six 
months the benefit is scaled down and becomes means-tested, and it is maintained for a 
maximum duration of 24 months.  
Following up on the compulsory “maternity protection” period, mothers and 
fathers are entitled to job-protected parental leave for an extended period of up to 34 
months.9 This means that both mothers and fathers have the right to return to a job that is 
comparable to the one held before birth within the same firm. If the parent returns within 
one year, he or she has the right to return to exactly the same work place as before. Firms 
                                                 
8 Kreyenfeld (2001, p. 44) reports that in Western Germany, less than three percent of children aged 0-3 are 
in public daycare, against one third of the children in the same age group in former East Germany. 
9 During the period of parental leave, the mother or father can work part-time between 15-30 hours per 
week, unless that would create considerable problems for the company. After parental leave has expired 
employees can return to work full-time.  
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are not allowed to dismiss the parent within this time period. However, this does not 
imply any protection of the wage level. Upon return, firms can pay a lower wage, even if 
the parent works the same number of hours (Bender et al. 2003).  
 
3.  The econometric model 
Our labour market model for women is based on that of Heckman (1976, 1979). The 
actual wage rate earned by a woman is determined as the “offer wage” that she can 
potentially earn on the labour market provided she participates. If she has a higher 
reservation wage, however, she chooses not to participate and the offer wage remains 
unobserved. The participation decision is modelled by means of a latent variable 
measuring the extent of participation, with a reduced-form equation explaining how the 
extent of participation depends on exogenous variables, and a censoring equation 
generating corner solution outcomes (zero participation). Formally we specify the 
following system of equations determining the wage rate ity1 ,  the latent participation 
measure  *2ity , and the actual participation measure ity2 : 
itiitit uxy 111
'
11)1( ++= αβ  
itiitit uzy 222
'*
2)2( ++= γδ  
{ }.,0max)3( *22 itit yy =  
As is conventional, the subscript  i  refers to a random cross-section of women in their 
fertile age ( Ni ,,1K= ) and the subscript  t  to a fixed set of calendar years (t =1994,…, 
2005). The primary dependent variable  ity1   is the logarithm of the hourly wage rate of 
individual  i  in year  t and is only selectively observed, namely, when the latent 
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participation decision *2ity  is positive. GSOEP respondents report actual working hours 
for the week preceding the interview and these are taken as selected observations of  ity2  
in equation (3). Nonpositive values of  *2ity  are observed as zero values of ity2 , indicating 
no paid activity took place. The relevant population is restricted to women aged 16 to 45 
at the time of entry into the panel, and who are neither students nor self-employed since 
the motives of the latter with respect to labour market participation are specific.  
The system comprises two sets of explanatory variables. In the wage equation, 
'
1itx   is a vector of K variables some of which may be endogenous, with 1β   the 
corresponding vector of coefficients. The variables in  itx1   include the determinants of 
both the offer and the reservation wage. In the participation equation, 'itz  is a vector of  
)( KL ≥  strictly exogenous variables which can be observed whether or not individual i  
participates in the labour market, with 2δ  the corresponding vector of coefficients. 
Because endogenous regressors and in particular the wage rate are excluded from it, the 
participation equation should be interpreted as a reduced-form equation. By the same 
token, itz  should include all exogenous determinants of the wage rate appearing in itx1  
and not dependent on being a participant, as well as any other available individual or 
household characteristic possibly affecting the wage rate indirectly.  
Equations (1) and (2) both include unobserved heterogeneity in the form of time-
constant individual effects denoted i1α  and i1γ .  As emphasised by Mundlak (1978), such 
unobserved individual effects are likely to be related to observed characteristics in itx1  
and itz   rather than independent. The remaining terms itu1  and itu2  are “idiosyncratic” 
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disturbances, with itu1  likely to have nonzero conditional expectation due to selective 
sampling, i.e., wages being observed for labour market participants only. Our model 
therefore combines problems of panel heterogeneity, endogenous sample selection and 
endogenous regressors. 
To tackle these combined problems we adopt the formal panel data framework of 
Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2006). In terms of the generality of 
the assumptions made, this framework presents a number of important advantages for our 
purposes. First and most recognisably, it disposes with the classical independence 
assumption on random effects. Specifically, it allows for unobserved effects correlated 
with observed individual characteristics, à la Mundlak (1978) or Chamberlain (1980), and 
manages to obtain consistent estimates for the wage equation in spite of the incidental 
parameter problem affecting the participation equation. Second, while in the cross-
sectional dimension of the panel the standard assumption of independent sampling is 
maintained,  no assumption of independence over time within panel units is required. 
Estimates will therefore be robust to serial correlation in the idiosyncratic disturbances 
itu1  and itu2 . Thirdly, the assumptions do not require that all explanatory variables in the 
wage equation are exogenous. Instead, to deal with the potential endogeneity of certain 
elements of itx1 , it is required that  itz1   can serve as a set of instrumental variables, i.e., 
that the variables in  itz1   are correlated with those in  itx1   yet strictly exogenous in both 
equations. The possibility to treat a regressor as endogenous is especially relevant for the 
number of working hours in the wage equation, which is by design part of the labour 
market outcome. Previous studies have pointed out that the number of hours worked by 
women is potentially endogenous with respect to the wage as high earning women might 
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decide to work longer hours and interrupt their careers less frequently than women who 
earn a lower wage (see Lundberg and Rose 2000).10  
In one respect however, the Semykina-Wooldridge framework does not suffice 
for our purposes. Whereas in their case the participation decision is observed only in the 
form of a binary 0/1 indicator ( [ ]01 *2 >= itit yd ), amenable to a probit selection process, 
here we can partially observe the latent variable  *2ity   (as 
*
22 ititit ydy = ).  This feature of 
our data motivates us to extend the existing framework by introducing a selection 
equation of the tobit type involving a corner solution. 
The vulnerability of selection models to unobserved heterogeneity in panel data is 
well known. The presence of unobserved individual effects causes an incidental 
parameter problem undermining the consistency results that are the usual justification for 
FE estimators. This is because every new individual in the panel comes with a new 
parameter, namely the unobserved effect. In linear models the problem is resolved by a 
data transformation (either “within” or “first differencing”) designed to eliminate the 
unobserved effects from the model and the corresponding likelihood function. In 
nonlinear models such as selection models this is not in general possible  The tobit 
limited choice specification shares this incidental parameters problem with the probit 
binary choice model. Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) propose to circumvent the 
incidental parameters problem by formalising the dependency of unobserved individual 
effects on appropriate instrumental variables or time averages, following the now classic 
                                                 
10 Dustmann and van Soest (1998) reject the hypothesis that working hours are exogenous for the male 
workers in GSOEP. Arguably, if working hours are endogenous for men, this is even more likely to be the 
case for women. 
 13
approaches of Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980). We now apply this idea in the 
context of the censored tobit participation model. 
Let us denote time-averages, initial levels or similar time-constant values of  the 
exogenous variables in itz  by so-called “Mundlak terms”  ⋅iz  and interpret them as a set 
of persistent individual features. We can decompose the unobserved individual effects 
into a systematic part linearly dependent on  
⋅iz   and an unexplained remainder term. 
Splitting both  i1α  and i1γ   in this way, and introducing some self-explanatory notation,  
the model is rewritten as the following system of two equations: 
itiiitit uzxy 11101111 '')4( ++++= ⋅ εξξβ  
{ }itiiitit uzzy 2220222 '',0max)5( ++++= ⋅ εξξδ . 
The composite disturbances in these two equations are likely to be correlated with each 
other, inasmuch as correlation is likely between the remaining individual effects  i1ε   and  
i2ε   as well as between the idiosyncratic disturbances  itu1   and  itu2 .  To deal with the 
potential correlation between the composite disturbances, Semykina and Wooldridge 
propose the following linear conditional expectation assumption:11 
( ) .,,,)6( 21221112211 ittitiTiitiiti uzzuuE ρερεε +=++ K  
While this is a formal assumption keeping the model manageable, it still provides 
flexibility by allowing residual correlation to subsist even after the introduction of the 
Mundlak terms controlling for persistent individual features in (4) and (5).  
In order to estimate the model with standard methods some further parametric 
assumptions are needed. In particular, the tobit selection model requires normality 
                                                 
11 This corresponds to parts (iii) and (iv) of Assumption 5.1 in Semykina and Wooldridge (2006). 
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assumptions for the unobserved terms of the participation equation  i2ε   and  itu2   (but 
not for those of the wage equation). Under these assumptions the participation equation 
(5) forms a sequence of T  cross-sectional censored tobit models, in which all individual 
effects are absorbed by the disturbances. From each cross-section equation the residuals 
can be computed, to serve as selectivity correction terms in the wage equation, in the 
same way that inverse Mills ratios would in a probit-based specification; see, e.g., 
Wooldridge (1995, 2002). We follow the Wooldridge proposal to make the estimation of 
the tobit participation equation less restrictive and (arguably) more robust by allowing all 
its coefficients to be time-varying. In the process of estimating the sequence of censored 
tobit models we found that the T  estimated cross-sectional equations are very similar and 
that restricting the coefficients to stay constant over time has very little effect on the 
estimated values. Although we exploit this finding to simplify our presentation of the 
estimated tobit model in Table 2 below, the selectivity correction terms in the wage 
equation will be obtained from unrestricted, time-varying estimates.  
Turning to the wage equation, Semykina and Wooldridge (2006) formally present 
a set of conditions under which equation (4) can be consistently estimated in spite of the 
combined problems of unobserved heterogeneity, sample selectivity, and endogeneity of 
some of the regressors in itx1 .  The proposed consistent estimation procedure is to regress  
ity1   on  ,,1 ⋅iit zx  and the selectivity correction terms by pooled 2SLS, using  ,, ⋅iit zz  and 
calculated inverse Mills ratios as instruments.12 The estimation method advocated for this 
                                                 
12 This corresponds to step (ii) in Semykina and Wooldridge’s Procedure 5.1. In the case of tobit selection, 
the selectivity correction terms are tobit residuals, which are not exogenous in the wage equation. Since the 
(calculated) inverse Mills ratios are (consistent estimates of) nonlinear functions of itz  they are 
(asymptotically) exogenous and can be used as instruments. Since no consistent estimator is available for 
FE-probit specifications we calculate the inverse Mills ratios from a FE-logit model for participation. 
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specification by Semykina and Wooldridge is pooled 2SLS. In order to allow for a more 
general error structure than required for the consistency of pooled 2SLS, we re-estimate 
the wage equation by RE-2SLS. Indeed, the wage equation (4) exhibits a composite 
disturbance term (with two “error components”), implying a nondiagonal variance-
covariance matrix. Under the assumptions made this does not affect the consistency of 
pooled 2SLS, although a GLS method like RE-2SLS is in principle more efficient. In 
addition to pooled 2SLS and RE-2SLS, we also estimate a FE-2SLS wage equation 
including the time-varying regressors only, as a basis for comparison and for 
specification testing.  
 
4.  The GSOEP panel data 
The empirical analysis is based on data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 
for the years 1994-2005.13 The GSOEP is a representative survey of the German 
population, which includes detailed information on employment, demographic and 
personal characteristics. We select the female respondents aged between 16 and 45 at the 
time they entered the panel, who are not students or self-employed. This age interval 
represents the fertile period in a woman’s life. The economic rationality for excluding 
self-employed and students is that both groups do not demand their reservation wage and 
that their choice of participation into the labour market is determined by other factors.14 
Apart from economic considerations these restrictions keep our sample comparable with 
those used in other studies.  
                                                 
13 In our analyses, we use the 95 % version of GSOEP. 
14 Self-employed can establish their own wages, whereas students will settle for less than their reservation 
wage since their main objective is to build up their human capital. 
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This section describes first the variables selected for the main wage equation and 
next the (exogenous) variables influencing the choice of working hours. Summary 
statistics of the main variables are presented in Table 1. The dependent variable of 
primary interest is the logarithm of the hourly wage rate. Hourly wages are calculated by 
dividing current gross earnings by the number of contractual working hours. We use 
contractual rather than actual working hours here because the available wage data is 
monthly whereas actual working hours are weekly (and for a single week). Contractual 
working hours is therefore likely to be a better measure of monthly working time.15 We 
exclude observations of hourly gross earnings lower than 3 euros and higher than 100 
euros. Although Germany formally does not have a minimum wage, standards are 
introduced by employers and unions which provide a guideline for labour market 
negotiations. Therefore we reason that wages below the threshold of 3 euros are most 
likely due to measurement errors.16  We obtain a final sample of 9,967 women, 7,419 of 
whom earn wages at some time (resulting in 59,406 panel observations overall). 
Our prime interest is to investigate how career breaks around maternity affect 
wages.  In each wave of the panel, we measure the incidence of maternal leave as the 
share of time spent in maternal leave in each of the five preceding years (denoted t-1, t-2, 
t-3, t-4, t-5).17 We interpret the time share of maternal leave in the previous calendar year 
(t-1) as a short-run measure and the shares in previous years (t-2, t-3, t-4, t-5) as controls 
                                                 
15 Using actual working hours in a week to construct hourly wages from monthly earnings is likely to 
induce a common measurement error and hence spurious negative correlation between the working hours 
and the calculated hourly wage rate. We partly avoid the problem by using contractual hours of work. 
Contractual hours also contain measurement errors but these affect only the hourly wage calculation and do 
not contaminate the actual hours of work variable which is included as a regressor in the wage equation. 
16 See WSI-Tarifarchiv of the Hans Böckler Stiftung. 
17 This information is taken from the ARTKALEN file which indicates the activity status in the previous 
calendar year. Maternal leave covers the periods of maternity protection and maternity benefits as well as 
parental leave. 
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for delayed effects. We take into account the past frequency of interruptions due to 
motherhood by including the number of children in the wage equation. Since other types 
of career interruptions may also affect the wage, we construct a dummy variable 
controlling for these in each of the last five years. The dummy variable combines the 
following types of interruptions: non-working, civil (or military) service, unemployment, 
and non working due to training or education.  
The human capital development indicators appearing in the wage equation are 
education, training, mismatch between education and the present job, experience and firm 
tenure. Education is measured in institutionalised years of schooling. Our training 
variable gives information on training incidence relevant for work in the year previous to 
the survey and is coded 1 if respondents trained and 0 if they did not train. The mismatch 
variable is based on the question whether respondents work in a job corresponding to 
their education. The variable is coded 1 if respondents declared that their job did not 
match their education. Further, we distinguish between full-time work experience, part-
time work experience, and accumulated unemployment spells; for full-time work 
experience an additional quadratic term is included. The tenure variable may account for 
firm-specific human capital and is expressed as firm tenure in years.18  
The wage equation further includes the following explanatory variables: actual 
working hours, dummies for temporary work contract and firm size, dummy variables 
indicating if the individual lives in former East Germany and if her country of origin is 
non-Western, and year dummies. The “Mundlak terms” (
⋅iz ) included are either time 
                                                 
18 The experience and tenure variables are based on the “generated files” of GSOEP which provide 
information on yearly labour market states. The mismatch variable was taken as such from the GSOEP 
generated files. It measures the preception of respondents concerning the match between their job and 
education. 
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averages or initial levels of the explanatory variables of the participation equation, to be 
specified shortly.  
 
(Insert TABLE 1 about here) 
 
In the working hours (censored tobit) equation, we use actual hours worked as the 
limited dependent variable, with zero working hours standing for unemployment or 
inactivity. The need for child care time is reflected not only by the number of children, 
but in addition by a set of dummy variables indicating the age of a mother’s youngest 
child in nine categories (age<1, 1 through 5, 6-12, 13-18, and older; the reference 
category being women without children). “Other household income” means household 
income excluding the panel member’s own wages. This consists of the earnings of other 
household members as well as asset income. It is calculated as the difference between the 
net monthly total household income and the current net monthly earnings of the 
respondent woman, and expressed in logarithms. 
Further explanatory variables in the working hours equation are age and age 
squared, education (institutionalised years), and dummy variables indicating marital 
status (1 if married), bad health (the respondent declaring her health to be either “not so 
good” or “bad”), house ownership, whether an individual lives in former East Germany, 
and whether her country of origin is non-Western.  
Time-constant Mundlak terms for both equations (
⋅iz ) are specified as either time 
averages or initial levels of time-varying variables that are assumed exogenous and 
observable for all panel members (participants and non-participants): average number of 
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children, average education level, average logarithm of other household income, initial 
experience levels (full-time, part-time and unemployment), average tenure, the averages 
of the dummy variables reflecting the childcare need and bad health, and initial house 
ownership.  
 
5.  Estimation results 
The first step in the estimation procedure is to estimate the working hours equation as a 
sequence of standard cross-sectional censored tobit regressions. Although we used such 
unrestricted year-by-year estimates to calculate the selectivity correction terms for use in 
the wage equation, we found that the year-by-year estimates do not differ much. To save 
space and improve readability, Table 2 reports a single set of coefficient estimates for the 
censored tobit working hours equation, pooled over the whole observation period  1994-
2005. The coefficients of the Mundlak terms are omitted from the table.  
 
(Insert TABLE 2 about here) 
 
 Inspection of the signs of the estimated coefficients reveals that all variables have 
effects in the expected direction. Having more children decreases the labour market 
participation of women, and mothers of young children work considerably shorter hours. 
This is especially true when the youngest child is younger than 6 years. Mothers hardly 
participate on the labour market when the youngest child is younger than one year. The 
results reflect the fact that the need for constant child care decreases as the child grows up 
and that mothers get more spare time when children go to school. When the youngest 
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child in the household grows older, females do again increase their labour force 
participation. A striking result is that mothers with children older than 12 actually work 
more hours than women without children. Mothers with children who are 19 years or 
older work in general seven hours more than females without children (the reference 
group).  Among the other variables, we find that an extra year of education and house 
ownership are associated with higher working hours, while other household income 
diminishes the need for paid work. Women living in former East Germany work slightly 
more hours than those in former West Germany which can be explained by the better 
availability of child care in this part of the country (see Kreyenfeld 2001).  
The residuals from the year-by-year tobit estimates are retrieved to serve as 
selection correction terms in the wage equation, to which we now turn. Three models 
allowing for different degrees of heterogeneity are estimated: Pooled OLS and RE, both 
including Mundlak terms, and FE (in which Mundlak terms are redundant). All 
specifications include the selectivity correction terms (residuals from the tobit selection 
equation). The Mundlak terms are time-averages or initial levels of the exogenous 
variables as specified at the end of previous section. Table 3 presents results treating all 
regressors as exogenous. 
 
(Insert TABLE 3 about here) 
 
The fraction of the previous calendar year spent on maternal leave has a 
significant negative effect on the hourly wage in the present year. Since this coefficient 
measures the direct effect of maternal leave on wages in the first following year, we 
 21
interpret it as the short term maternal leave penalty. This penalty is robustly negative 
under the different estimation methods. However, the size of the wage penalty varies 
between 10.3% in the pooled estimation and approximately 6% in the RE and FE 
estimation. The coefficients of the fractions spent on maternal leave in the calendar years 
t-2 until t-5 are smaller than the coefficient of the fraction spent on maternal leave in the 
previous year. This indicates that mothers’ wages catch up over time. At the same time, 
the persistent negative coefficient of about 4.5% for the time spent on maternal leave in 
year t -4 implies that mothers are still confronted with a substantial wage penalty four 
years after they took the maternal leave. It is surprising, especially in the light of a human 
capital interpretation, to find a higher penalty four years after a maternal leave than two 
or three. However, a possible explanation for this resurgence in the fourth year is that 
some mothers, by returning to work only after taking the maximum length of parental 
leave, signal a relatively low degree of labour market attachment and are punished for 
this by a higher penalty compared to earlier returners.  
Focusing on the effects of other work interruptions, we find that the occurrence of 
non-maternal interruptions in the preceding year also leads to substantial wage losses, 
although these losses are less than many estimates reported for Germany in the literature. 
The wage penalty of a work interruption other than maternal leave in the preceding year 
varies between 5.5% in the pooled estimation to 6.2% in the FE estimation. Non-maternal 
work interruptions in the years t-2 and t-3, in contrast with maternal interruptions at those 
lags, also have robust negative coefficients; but non-maternal work interruptions 
significantly affect wages only for three years. This means that maternal leave sometimes 
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has a more persistent effect than other interruptions, and suggests that other factors than 
human capital depreciation are also influencing the wage penalty.  
Considering the other explanatory variables, we find as would be expected that 
years of education, training, full-time and part-time work experience, firm tenure and 
firm size tend to have a positive effect on the wage rate; while unemployment experience, 
a temporary contract, and a mismatch between a woman’s job and her education level 
have a negative effect on her wage. Moreover, women with a non-Western country of 
origin or living in former East Germany earn lower wages. It seems safe to say that the 
number of children has no direct effect in the wage equation, in addition to its indirect 
effect through actual working hours. The use of different estimation methods also 
influences the magnitude and sometimes the sign of these coefficients. The largest 
differences are between the FE and the pooled OLS estimates, with RE appearing as a 
compromise. The effects of full-time working experience, training, mismatch between 
education and job, firm tenure, the firm size and the number of children on the wage 
become smaller (or even insignificantly negative) in the FE estimations. Clearly, the 
estimation of the fixed effects interferes with the estimation of other effects that only 
slowly evolve over time (part-time work experience, training, firm tenure). On the other 
hand, the negative effect of unemployment experience increases strikingly (though its 
standard error increases proportionately). The sign of the coefficient of the working hours 
variable becomes negative in the FE estimation. The selectivity correction terms are 
small and statistically insignificant in the pooled estimation, but become very significant 
in the RE and FE models, even though they remain rather small in magnitude. 
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Another feature which emerges from our wage equations in Table 3 deserves 
attention. The pooled OLS regression suffers from positive residual autocorrelation. 
Although a formal test is complicated, there remain practically no signs of incomplete 
dynamics once individual unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for (either in the FE or 
in the RE form). To a large extent dynamics and heterogeneity seem to capture each 
other’s effects. Whereas the RE specification is successful in terms of capturing 
heterogeneity, it is rejected by a Hausman test against the FE specification. We attribute 
the rejection to the specific distributional assumptions made which does not necessarily 
affect the coefficient estimates very much and clearly does not impair the goodness of fit 
at all. In our experience this is the usual outcome with large data sets and the price to be 
paid for the theoretical gain in efficiency.  
 
(Insert TABLE 4 about here) 
 
Finally, in Table 4, we allow for endogeneity of the working hours variable as 
well as the selection correction terms (tobit residuals). The number of hours worked by 
women is allowed to be endogenous with respect to the wage rate since it is determined 
as an outcome of the labour supply decision, and clearly high earning women might work 
more hours and interrupt their careers less frequently than women who earn a lower 
wage. The actual working hours variable is instrumented with age and age squared, other 
monthly household income (in logarithm), house ownership, number of children, the need 
for child care, marital status and bad health. These are variables that are not under the 
control of an individual, at least in the short run, and that can be assumed independent of 
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the error components in equations (4) and (5). Since they appear in the working hours 
equation they are relevant instruments. It might be argued that in a life cycle context the 
number of children, as well as variables measuring education and experience, should be 
treated as endogenous. Unfortunately, the time span of personal histories in our data is 
too limited for such purposes. The equations include the same selectivity regressors and 
the same Mundlak time-averages or initial levels of the exogenous variables as in Table 
3. As instrumental variables targeting the selectivity regressors (tobit residuals) we used 
inverse Mills ratios calculated from a FE logit participation equation.19  
The first column presents the 2SLS pooled estimates, the second column the RE-
2SLS estimates, and the third column the FE-2SLS estimates. Allowing for the 
endogeneity of actual working hours leads to some substantial differences in results. The 
working hours coefficient itself turns negative and quite significant. According to these 
estimates, adding another day (8 hours) to one’s working week would cost around 10% of 
the wage rate. Our interpretation is that 2SLS corrects a positive simultaneity bias in the 
working hours coefficients of Table 3 and identifies a negatively sloped labour demand 
function reflecting the decreasing marginal productivity associated with increasing actual 
(though not necessarily contractual) working hours. It is furthermore possible that we are 
at the same time redressing measurement error and/or omitted variable biases. Consider 
in particular the case that actual working hours are positively correlated with job level or 
status and are capturing their effects. The consequence would be a positive omitted 
                                                 
19 See Footnote 12. The justification for using a FE logit rather than FE probit selection equation for the 
calculation of the inverse Mills ratios is that the incidental parameters can be eliminated in the former and 
not in the latter. A separate instrumental variable containing the inverse Mills ratio is constructed for each 
of the 12 panel years.   
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variable bias in the working hours coefficient consistent with the estimates we see in 
Table 3.  
The working hours coefficient is not the only one affected by the 2SLS method. 
The cost of a maternal leave in terms of the mother’s wage in the first year following the 
interruption increases to 19% in the pooled estimation, 14% in the RE estimation and 
10% in the FE model. Penalties for other career interruptions do not increase or only 
slightly. The number of children still has no additional direct effect in the wage equation.  
Most experience effects are enhanced but again the estimation of fixed effects can 
interfere with them. 
To sum up we have found, using different methods, a wage penalty for maternal 
leave ranging between 6 and almost 20%; but the estimates with the best theoretical 
properties  range only from 10 to 14%. The selectivity correction terms are statistically 
significant, although less so in the pooled estimations than in the RE and FE models. The 
selectivity correction has a limited impact on the coefficient estimates in the pooled and 
RE models; it causes more changes in the FE model.20 Accounting for heterogeneity by 
fixed and random effects reduces the estimated penalties by one third to one half. 
Accounting for the endogeneity of working hours on the contrary practically doubles the 
penalty estimates. Even more noteworthy is the effect of instrumenting actual working 
hours on the working hours coefficient itself. From close to zero in Table 3, this 
coefficient turns strongly negative in the two-stage least squares estimates of Table 4. 
This is consistent with the idea that we identify a labour demand relationship negatively 
                                                 
20 Estimates excluding the selectivity correction but taking the endogeneity of working hours into account 
are available in Table 5 in the Annex. 
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sloped because of decreasing marginal productivity. It is suggested that there is a positive 
premium on part-time work causing bias in OLS estimates of the wage penalty.  
How do our results compare to the estimates based on German data cited earlier? 
The estimated penalties of Beblo and Wolf (2002), Kunze (2002), Kunze and Ejrnaes 
(2004) and Beblo and Wolf (2006) range approximately from 10% to 30% (although 
insignificant in the case of Beblo and Wolf 2002). Our estimate best comparable in terms 
of methodological choices is the FE estimate in Table 3, which is only 6%. Apart from 
methodological choices, this large discrepancy in the magnitude of the penalty may also  
be explained by differences in data sources and sample definitions, such as a longer time 
span and the restriction to full-time workers. For instance, Kunze and Ejrnaes (2004) 
focus on women who work full-time, have a strong labour market attachment, and return 
to work within one year after a first birth. In Beblo and Wolf  (2006) women working in 
large firms are over-represented as it is easier to find a match for them.  
Regarding the persistence of maternal leave effects in time, we see again a 
relatively optimistic pattern emerge from our estimates. Kunze (2002) finds delayed 
effects that decrease only very slowly over the years. In the fifth year following a career 
interruption (maternal or otherwise) we find no remaining wage penalty. At first sight our 
estimates may seem roughly consistent with the hypothesis of a human capital 
depreciation following career interruptions and a period of restoration upon return to the 
labour market. Nonetheless our results indicate that this explanation is incomplete; they 
suggest the existence of additional signalling effects linked to the length of maternal 
leave taken. In particular the choice of some mothers to take the maximum duration of 
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leave might be taken as a negative signal on the labour market. We think this point 
deserves further investigation.   
 
6. Concluding remarks  
In this paper, we analyzed the wage penalty effect of maternal leave using data on women 
in their fertile age from GSOEP. We adopted the estimation framework proposed by 
Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2006), but replaced their probit 
selection equation by a tobit specification. This extension allowed us to exploit the 
available working hours information. 
We have focused in particular on estimating the short term and delayed wage 
penalties of the fraction of time in a year spent on maternal leave. When accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity and selectivity we found a sizeable wage penalty in the first 
year following the maternal leave of about 6%. When accounting in addition for the 
endogeneity of working hours we found a penalty of 10 to 14%. The occurrence of other 
types of interruptions in the previous year tends to result in a somewhat lower wage 
penalty. The rough similarity in these figures suggests that both may be interpreted as the 
result of a comparable depreciation of human capital in the short run. Delayed effects, 
however, reveal different patterns. The wage penalty is very small or inexistent for 
maternal leave taken two or three years ago, suggesting that mothers catch up quickly 
over time; whereas the effect of non-maternal leaves decreases more gradually. However, 
mothers seem to undergo a resurgence in wage penalty four years after the start of a 
maternal leave. No such resurgence is observed with other types of interruptions. An 
intriguing interpretation is that this peculiarity reflects a signalling effect affecting 
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mothers who return to work only after having taken up the maximum legal length of 
parental leave to the end. The differences in delayed effects between maternal leaves and 
other types of interruptions are not predicted by human capital theory and indicate the 
need for additional explanations, probably of the signalling type. 
On a methodological note, we conclude that allowing for endogeneity of labour 
supply in the wage equation, in addition to correcting for unobserved heterogeneity and 
sample selectivity, has a large impact on the estimates. Our wage equation turned out to 
be quite sensitive in this respect. Treating working hours as endogenous more or less 
doubled the initial size of the maternal leave wage penalty, resulting in our reported range 
of 10-14%. Instrumenting working hours also drastically changed the working hours 
coefficient itself, resulting in a negatively sloped relationship as would be expected in a 
labour demand function.  
Compared to other studies on the effects of maternity and child care interruptions 
on the wages of mothers in Germany, our estimates are rather optimistic in terms of both 
the magnitude and the persistence of the penalty for maternal leave.  
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 Table 1  Summary statistics  
 
Variable description Entire sample Participant Non-participant 
Participation 
          (1 if working) 
0.61 1 0 
 
Actual working hours 
          in the previous week 
 33.86 
(11.95) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Hourly earnings          
          (in logarithms) 
 2.36 
(0.46) 
 
 
Fraction of previous year in maternal      
          leave 
0.08 
(0.25) 
0.03 
(0.14) 
0.17 
(0.35) 
Fraction of year t-2 spent in maternal  
          leave 
0.08 
(0.25) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
0.15 
(0.32) 
Fraction of year t-3 spent in maternal  
          leave 
0.08 
(0.25) 
0.05 
(0.20) 
0.14 
(0.31) 
Fraction of year t-4 spent in maternal  
          leave 
0.08 
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.22) 
0.13 
(0.31) 
Fraction of year t-5 spent in maternal  
          leave 
0.08 
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.22) 
0.12 
(0.30) 
Other interruptions in previous year 
          (1 if interruption) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
Number of children 1.26 
(1.21) 
1.12 
(1.10) 
1.48 
(1.31) 
Age of youngest child in years 9.58 
(7.33) 
11.61 
(6.86) 
6.80 
(7.08) 
Age in years 33.98 
(9.46) 
35.28 
(9.00) 
31.97 
(9.83) 
Bad health 
          (1 if health “not so good” or “bad”) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
Marital status  
          (1 if married) 
0.58 
(0.49) 
0.56 
(0.49) 
0.61 
(0.48) 
Education in institutionalised years 11.78 
(2.47) 
12.11 
(2.46) 
11.21 
(2.37) 
Training  
          (1 if trained) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.10 
(0.31) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Full-time work experience in years 7.49 
(7.41) 
9.06 
(7.80) 
4.98 
(5.95) 
Part-time work experience in years 2.29 
(4.09) 
2.95 
(4.61) 
1.21 
(2.77) 
Unemployment experience in years 0.62 
(1.46) 
0.46 
(1.09) 
0.90 
(1.90) 
Temporary contract  
          (1 if temporary contract) 
 0.16 
(0.36) 
 
Mismatch  
          (1 if mismatch) 
 0.45 
(0.50) 
 
 
Firm tenure in years  6.93 
(7.05) 
 
Firm size  
          (1 if 200 workers or more) 
 0.39 
(0.49) 
 
East  
          (1 if living in Eastern Germany) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
Other household income, monthly  
          (in logarithm) 
7.37 
(0.80) 
7.21 
(0.91) 
7.61 
(0.52) 
House ownership  
          (1 if household own their house) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.43 
(0.50) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
Number of observations 59,406 33,791 21,352 
Number of individualsR 9,967 7,419 6,304 
 
Notes: Main entries are sample means, numbers in parentheses are sample standard deviations. 
R  We observe 3,756 individuals who appear both as a participant and as a non-participant in different waves of the panel.  
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Table 2  Selection equation 
Dependent variable: Participation  Tobit 
model 
Number of children   -2.675 
  (.1497) 
Youngest child aged < 1  -40.518 
  (0.738) 
Youngest child aged 1  -29.357 
  (0.639) 
Youngest child aged 2  -21.355 
  (0.638) 
Youngest child aged 3  -13.697 
  (0.648) 
Youngest child aged 4  -10.531 
  (0.662) 
Youngest child aged 5  -8.786 
  (0.673) 
Youngest child aged between 6 and 12  -1.559 
  (0.420) 
Youngest child aged  between 13 and 18  4.857 
  (0.452) 
Youngest child aged > 18  7.592 
  (0.548) 
Marital status   -0.731 
          (1 if married)  (0.291) 
Education in institutionalised years   2.811 
  (0.150) 
Bad health   -0.375 
          (1 if health “not so good” or “bad”)  (0.451) 
Age in years   1.597 
  (0.108) 
Age squared   -0.031 
  (.002) 
Other household income, monthly   -6.757 
          (in logarithm)  (0.211) 
House ownership   4.380 
          (1 if house owner)  (0.326) 
East  1.859 
          (1 if living in Eastern Germany)  (0.267) 
Country of origin  -1.462 
          (1 if non-Western)  (0.348) 
Mundlak terms  Included 
   
Number of effective observations   47,321 
Number of individuals   8,355 
 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) should be interpreted as asymptotic lower bounds.  Year dummies and Mundlak terms are 
included. For convenience, the tobit coefficients shown are pooled estimates over 1994-2005. Year-by-year estimates (which exhibit 
little variation over time) have been used for the calculation of the selectivity correction terms included in the wage equation.  
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Table 3   Wage equation with selectivity correction: Pooled, RE and FE 
 
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage  Pooled RE model FE model 
Actual working hours  0.051 0.005 -0.050 
          (hours divided by 40) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) 
Fraction of previous year in maternal leave -0.103 -0.063 -0.061 
 (0.032) (0.023) (0.024) 
Fraction of year t-2 spent in maternal leave -0.006 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.029) (0.019) (0.020) 
Fraction of year t-3 spent in maternal leave 0.011 0.011 0.002 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.018) 
Fraction of year t-4 spent in maternal leave -0.044 -0.048 -0.045 
 (0.024) (0.016) (0.017) 
Fraction of year t-5 spent in maternal leave -0.012 -0.006 -0.008 
           (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t-1 -0.055 -0.059 -0.062 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -2 -0.031 -0.041 -0.041 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -3 -0.044 -0.048 -0.044 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -4 -0.013 -0.002 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -5 -0.021 -0.019 -0.015 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
Number of children 0.053 0.026 0.004 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) 
Education in institutionalised years 0.012 0.016 0.017 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Full-time work experience in years  3.026 3.614 1.590 
           (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.239) (0.299) (1.080) 
Full-time work experience squared  -1.758 -3.213 -3.894 
          (coefficient multiplied by 10,000) (0.475) (0.651) (1.054) 
Part-time work experience in years  1.268 0.997 -0.750 
          (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.242) (0.287) (1.047) 
Unemployment experience in years  -1.909 -2.693 -7.588 
          (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.522) (0.690) (1.843) 
Temporary contract  -0.089 -0.101 -0.100 
          (1 if temporary contract) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
Training   0.043 0.003 -0.008 
          (1 if trained) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) 
Mismatch   -0.134 -0.117 -0.096 
          (1 if mismatch) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
Firm tenure in years  0.432 0.165 -0.117 
          (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.069) (0.077) (0.096) 
Firm size  0.167 0.107 .048 
          (1 if 200 workers or more) (0.007) (0.810) (.011) 
East  -0.256 -0.246 -0.231 
          (1 if living in Eastern Germany) (0.008) (0.014) (0.052) 
Country of origin -0.062 -0.059  
          (1 if non-Western) (0.012) (0.019)  
Mundlak terms Included Included Redundant 
    
Standard error individual effects  0.267 0.359 
Standard error residual 0.312 0.185 0.185 
Autocorrelation of residuals  0.694 -0.043 -0.071 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Hausman Test RE vs FE chi-square(35)   228.50 
          p-value Hausman test   (0.000) 
    
Number of effective observations 9,137 9,137 9,137 
Number of individuals 2,901 2,901 2,901 
 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) should be interpreted as asymptotic lower bounds. Year dummies and selection correction 
terms (tobit residuals) are included though not reported. Mundlak terms are included in the pooled and RE models but redundant in the 
FE model.  The selection correction terms have significant effects in the RE and FE models but not in the Pooled estimates. 
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Table 4: Wage equation with selectivity correction and endogeneity: Two stage least squares  
 
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage  Pooled RE model FE model 
Actual working hours  -0.495 -0.612 -0.494 
          (hours divided by 40) (0.095) (0.106) (0.189) 
Fraction of previous year in maternal leave -0.193   -0.139 -0.101 
           (0.038) (0.029) (0.032) 
Fraction of year t-2 spent in maternal leave -0.025 -0.033 -0.016 
 (0.031) (0.022) (0.022) 
Fraction of year t-3 spent in maternal leave 0.010 0.006 0.002 
           (0.028) (0.020) (0.020) 
Fraction of year t-4 spent in maternal leave -0.074 -0.061 -0.044 
 (0.026) (0.018) (0.018) 
Fraction of year t-5 spent in maternal leave -0.021 -0.019 -0.010 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -1 -0.095 -0.086 -0.072 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -2 -0.064 -0.065 -0.051 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -3 -0.071 -0.065 -0.050 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -4 -0.028 -0.008 0.008 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -5 -0.043 -0.027 -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) 
Number of children 0.025 -0.017 -0.022 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) 
Education in institutionalised years 0.015 0.016 0.016 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Full-time work experience in years  4.031 4.872 4.108 
           (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.309) (0.396) (1.550) 
Full-time work experience squared  -1.479 -3.972 -4.659 
          (coefficient multiplied by 10,000) (0.516) (0.730) (1.180) 
Part-time work experience in years  -0.725 0.040 1.566 
          (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.415) (0.359) (1.469) 
Unemployment experience in years  -0.870 -2.740 -9.119 
          (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.588) (0.758) (2.083) 
Temporary contract  -0.048 -0.060 -0.081 
          (1 if temporary contract) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) 
Training   0.071 0.016 -0.003 
          (1 if trained) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
Mismatch   -0.155 -0.132 -0.100 
          (1 if mismatch) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
Firm tenure in years  0.396 0.208 -0.010 
          (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.075) (0.086) (0.102) 
Firm size  0.186 0.124 0.052 
          (1 if 200 workers or more) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
East  -0.207 -0.166 -0.238 
          (1 if living in Eastern Germany) (0.012) (0.020) (0.055) 
Country of origin -0.044 -0.037  
          (1 if non-Western) (0.013) (0. 021)  
Mundlak terms Included Included Redundant 
    
Standard error individual effects  0.275 0.410 
Standard error residual 0.337 0.196 0.195 
Autocorrelation of residuals  0.724 -0.012 -0.035 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Hausman Test RE vs FE chi-square(28)   118.04 
          p-value Hausman test   (0.000) 
    
Number of effective observations 9,137 9,137 9,137 
Number of individuals 2,901 2,901 2,901 
 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) should be interpreted as asymptotic lower bounds. Year dummies and selection correction 
terms (tobit residuals) are included though not reported. Mundlak terms are included in the pooled and RE models but redundant in the 
FE model.  Actual working hours and the tobit residuals are treated as endogenous. Instruments used: age and age squared,  other 
household income (log), house ownership, number of children, dummy variables indicating the age of the youngest child, bad health, 
marital status, and inverse Mills ratios calculated from FE logit estimates of the participation equation. The selection correction terms 
have significant effects in the RE and FE models, much less so in the Pooled estimates. 
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ANNEX  
 
Table 5 presents results of pooled, RE and FE estimation without correction for the self-
selection of women into non-participation. Selection correction resulted in lower or very 
similar estimates in all three specifications and for all variables except temporary 
contract, education, east, and country of origin. In Pooled 2SLS and RE-2SLS, 
maternal leave penalties  remain almost the same or slightly lower with the same time 
pattern in TABLE 4. However, the 2SLS- FE estimates without selection correction, 
presented in the last column of Table 5, differ substantially from their counterparts with 
selection correction. The actual working hours and full-time work experience variables 
turn insignificant, and the wage penalty due to maternal leave in the previous 
year decreases to 7% (from 10% in Table 4). However, the time pattern of the delayed 
effects of interruptions  remains the same in the FE-2SLS models of Tables 4 and 5.  
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Table 5: Wage equation without selection correction: Two stage least squares 
 
Dependent variable: Log hourly wage  Pooled RE model FE model 
Actual working hours  -0.383 -0.337 0.072 
          (hours divided by 40) (0.086) (0.089) (0.141) 
Fraction of previous year in maternal leave -0.193 -0.136 -0.070 
           (0.037) (0.027) (0.030) 
Fraction of year t-2 spent in maternal leave -0.029 -0.035 -0.018 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.021) 
Fraction of year t-3 spent in maternal leave 0.007 0.001 -0.004 
           (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) 
Fraction of year t-4 spent in maternal leave -0.065 -0.058 -0.049 
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) 
Fraction of year t-5 spent in maternal leave -0.014 -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.016) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -1 -0.081 -0.071 -0.058 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -2 -0.052 -0.051 -0.038 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -3 -0.062 -0.056 -0.043 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -4 -0.023 -0.004 0.007 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) 
Dummy if other interruptions in year t -5 -0.035 -0.023 -0.016 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) 
Number of children 0.015 -0.009 0.001 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.019) 
Education in institutionalised years 0.019 0.020 0.019 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Full-time work experience in years  3.646 4.108 0.692 
           (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.278) (0.344) (1.316) 
Full-time work experience squared  -1.707 -3.932 -4.053 
          (coefficient multiplied by 10,000) (0.491) (0.674) (1.113) 
Part-time work experience in years  -0.079 0.549 -1.614 
          (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.366) (0.319) (1.229) 
Unemployment experience in years  -1.261 -2.727 -6.859 
          (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.555) (0.700) (1.929) 
Temporary contract  -0.062 -0.085 -0.109 
          (1 if temporary contract) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) 
Training   0.062 0.009 -0.010 
          (1 if trained) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
Mismatch   -0.148 -.123 -0.094 
          (1 if mismatch) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Firm tenure in years  0.403 0.170 -0.136 
          (coefficient multiplied by 100) (0.071) (0.079) (0.097) 
Firm size  0.179 0.113 0.046 
          (1 if 200 workers or more) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
East  -0.218 -0.207 -0.226 
          (1 if living in Eastern Germany) (0.011) (0.017) (0.052) 
Country of origin -0.054 -0.054  
          (1 if non-Western) (0.012) (0.019)  
Mundlak terms Included Included Redundant 
    
Standard error individual effects  0.268 0.380 
Standard error residual 0.323 0.187 0.187 
Autocorrelation of residuals  0.730 -0.053 -0.084 
 (0.008) (0.013) (.013) 
Hausman Test RE vs FE chi-square(36)   119.10 
          p-value Hausman test   (0.000) 
    
Number of effective observations 9,137 9,137 9,137 
Number of individuals 2,901 2,901 2,901 
 
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) should be interpreted as asymptotic lower bounds. Year dummies are included though not 
reported. Mundlak terms are included in the pooled and RE models but redundant in the FE model. Actual working hours are treated 
as endogenous. Instruments used: age and age squared,  other household income (log), house ownership, number of children, dummy 
variables indicating the age of the youngest child, bad health and marital status. 
